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    • Coverpage and colophon (and Table of Contents in PDF version)
    • Preface 2018
  • PART I. – INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
    • Chapter 1. Thesis Statement, Dispositions and Legal Methods
      • 1.1. Introduction and Thesis Statement
        • 1.1.1. About Regulatory Complexity
      • 1.2. What is a Trading Venue?
      • 1.3. Thesis Layout – Disposition
      • 1.4. Delimitations
      • 1.5. Legal Methods
        • 1.5.1. Legal Dogmatic Considerations
        • 1.5.2. Law and Economics Considerations and the TILPAG-model
          • 1.5.2.1. Coase, Externalities and Perfect Competition
          • 1.5.2.2. On Efficiency
          • 1.5.2.3. On Positive and Normative Analysis and Additional Delimitations
        • 1.5.3. Legal Policy Considerations
        • 1.5.4. Sources of Law, Legal Hierarchy and Empirical Data
          • 1.5.4.1. Empirical Data and Market Information
        • 1.5.5. Comparative Considerations
    • Chapter 2. The European Securities Market
      • 2.1. From National Monopoly to International Competition
        • 2.1.1. Short Historic Overview
          • 2.1.1.1. From the Sergé Report to the 1985 White Paper
          • 2.1.1.2. From the 1985 White Paper to ISD
          • 2.1.1.3. FSAP
          • 2.1.1.4. MiFID I and the 2005 White Paper
          • 2.1.1.5. Post Financial Crisis Regulation
          • 2.1.1.6. The MiFID II Regime
      • 2.2. Current Industry Overview
        • 2.2.1. The Buy-side
        • 2.2.2. The Sell-side
        • 2.2.3. The Market Infrastructure
        • 2.2.4. The Issuers
      • 2.3. Financial Instruments under the MiFID II Regime
        • 2.3.1. Equities Instruments
        • 2.3.2. Non-equity Instruments
      • 2.4. Statistical Overview
  • PART II – TILPAG-ANALYSIS
    • Chapter 3. Transaction Costs
      • 3.1. Introduction
      • 3.2. Transaction Cost Components and Analysis
        • 3.2.1. Explicit Transaction Costs
          • 3.2.1.1. Broker/Dealer Commissions
          • 3.2.1.2. Trading Venue Fees
          • 3.2.1.3. Advisor Fees
          • 3.2.1.4. Search Costs
          • 3.2.1.5. Technology and Operational Investments
        • 3.2.2. Implicit Transaction Costs
          • 3.2.2.1. Bid-Ask Spreads
          • 3.2.2.2. Impact and Timing
      • 3.3. High Frequency Trading (HFT) – The Flash Crash and the Arms Race
        • 3.3.1. Regulatory Measures and Transaction Cost Implications
      • 3.4. Data Reporting and Fragmentation
        • 3.4.1. Data Reporting under MiFID II
          • 3.4.1.1. Approved Publication Arrangement (APA)
          • 3.4.1.2. Approved Reporting Mechanism (ARM)
          • 3.4.1.3. Consolidated Tape Providers (CTP)
      • 3.5. Best Execution and Transaction Costs
        • 3.5.1. Best Execution under MiFID II
          • 3.5.1.1. Smart Order Routing and Trading Venue Obligations
          • 3.5.1.2. Best possible result
            • 3.5.1.2.1. Prices at abnormal or artificial levels
            • 3.5.1.2.2. Price or costs?
          • 3.5.1.3. Best Execution and the Unbundling Rules for Research
      • 3.6. Concluding Remarks
    • Chapter 4. Information
      • 4.1. Introduction
      • 4.2. Theories on Information
        • 4.2.1. Understanding the Efficient Market Hypothesis
          • 4.2.1.1. Critic of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
        • 4.2.2. Understanding Asymmetric Information
          • 4.2.2.1. Asymmetric Information in Financial markets
      • 4.3. Regulated Information
        • 4.3.1. The Prospectus Rules – Information on the Primary Market
          • 4.3.1.1. The Content, Publication and Approval of the Prospectus
          • 4.3.1.2. Equity and Non-Equity Instruments
          • 4.3.1.3. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME)
        • 4.3.2. Periodic and Ongoing Disclosure Requirements – Information on the Secondary Market
          • 4.3.2.1. Market Abuse
          • 4.3.2.2. EU Definitions and Scope of MAR
          • 4.3.2.3. Some Perspectives on Inside Information and Insider Dealing
          • 4.3.2.4. Some Perspectives on Market Manipulation
          • 4.3.2.5. Market Surveillance
      • 4.4. Price Information
        • 4.4.1. Market Structure Perspectives
          • 4.4.1.1. Market Model and Pre-trade Transparency
            • 4.4.1.1.1. Lit and Dark Markets
          • 4.4.1.2. Consolidated Tapes and Post-trade Transparency
            • 4.4.1.2.1. Comparative Perspectives
        • 4.4.2. Pre- and Post-trade Transparency Rules under MiFIR
          • 4.4.2.1. Equity Instruments
          • 4.4.2.2. Non-equity Instruments
          • 4.4.2.3. Systematic Internalization
      • 4.5. Concluding Remarks
    • Chapter 5. Liquidity
      • 5.1. Introduction
      • 5.2. Liquidity Definitions and Thresholds under the MiFID II Regime
        • 5.2.1. Equity and Equity-like Instruments
          • 5.2.1.1. Shares
          • 5.2.1.2. Equity-like Instruments
        • 5.2.2. Non-equity Instruments
          • 5.2.2.1. Components of the Definition of a Liquid Market
          • 5.2.2.2. Case Study: The Danish Market for Covered (Mortgage) Bonds
      • 5.3. Regulation of Order Execution
        • 5.3.1. Liquidity and Trading Venue Market Models
          • 5.3.1.1. Order-driven markets
          • 5.3.1.2. Quote-driven markets
          • 5.3.1.3. Periodic Auction Trading Systems – Call Markets
          • 5.3.1.4. Request for Quote Systems – RFQ Markets
          • 5.3.1.5. Hybrid Markets
          • 5.3.1.6. Voice broking systems
        • 5.3.2. Liquidity and Market Participant Conduct
          • 5.3.2.1. Order Types
          • 5.3.2.2. Best Execution and Liquidity
          • 5.3.2.3. Dark Pools, the MiFID II Tick Size Regime and Liquidity
          • 5.3.2.4. Short Selling and Liquidity
          • 5.3.2.5. Proprietary Trading, Ring Fencing and the U.S. Volcker Rule
          • 5.3.2.6. High Frequency Trading and Liquidity
      • 5.4. Concluding Remarks
    • Chapter 6. Profit
      • 6.1. The Quest for Profit
      • 6.2. Revenue Streams of Trading Venues
        • 6.2.1. Listing Services
        • 6.2.2. Information Services
          • 6.2.2.1. Regulated Information
          • 6.2.2.2. Price Information
        • 6.2.3. Market Services
      • 6.3. Regulatory Burdens, Level Playing Field and Universal Trading Venues
        • 6.3.1. Compliance Costs and Red Tape
          • 6.3.1.1. Supervision
          • 6.3.1.2. Cost estimations
          • 6.3.2. Consolidation and Diversification
          • 6.3.2.1. Case Study: The Banking Industry
          • 6.3.2.2. The European Trading Venues
      • 6.4. Concluding Remarks
    • Chapter 7. Agents
      • 7.1. Introduction
        • 7.1.1. Principal-Agent Theory and Trading Venues
        • 7.1.2. Conflict of Interest Theory and Trading Venues
      • 7.2. Conflict of Interest Regulation under the MiFID II Regime – Investment Firms
        • 7.2.1. Investment firms
          • 7.2.1.1. Internalisation
          • 7.2.1.2. Tied Agents
          • 7.2.1.3. Inducements and Investment Advice
          • 7.2.1.4. Investment firms operating a Trading Venue
      • 7.3. Conflict of Interest Regulation under the MiFID II Regime – Regulated Markets and Market Operators
        • 7.3.1. Shareholders and Group Structures
          • 7.2.2.2. Market Members as Competitors
        • 7.3.2. Self-Regulation
        • 7.3.3. Issuers and Product Providers
        • 7.3.4. Public Interest
          • 7.3.4.1. Exchange Companies as Listed Companies
          • 7.3.4.2. Removal of Authorisation and Bankruptcy
      • 7.4. Concluding Remarks
    • Chapter 8. Governance
      • 8.1. Introduction and Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector
      • 8.2. Governance of Investment Firms
        • 8.2.1. The Management Body of an Investment Firm
        • 8.2.2. General Organisational Requirements – Article 16 of MiFID II
          • 8.2.2.1. Product Manufactures
          • 8.2.2.2. Outsourcing
          • 8.2.2.3. Recordkeeping
          • 8.2.2.4. Safekeeping, Collateral Arrangements and Supervision
        • 8.2.3. Investment Firms Engaging in Algorithmic Trading and HFT
          • 8.2.3.1. Testing and Deployment
          • 8.2.3.2. Preventing Market Abuse
          • 8.2.3.3. Governance and Staff
          • 8.2.3.4. Direct Electronic Access
          • 8.2.3.5. Market Making Strategy
        • 8.2.4. Investment Firms Acting as Clearing Members
        • 8.2.5. Investment Firms Operating a Trading Venue
      • 8.3. Governance of Market Operators and Regulated Markets
        • 8.3.1. The Management Body of a Market Operator
          • 8.3.1.1. Good Repute and Collective Knowledge, Skills and Experience
          • 8.3.1.2. Time Commitment and Training Requirements
          • 8.3.1.3. Honesty, Integrity and Independence
          • 8.3.1.4. Nomination Committee
          • 8.3.1.5. Diversity
          • 8.3.1.6. Remuneration
        • 8.3.2. General Organisational Requirements – Article 47 of MiFID II
        • 8.3.3. Trading Venues Allowing Algorithmic Trading and HFT
          • 8.3.3.1. Self-assessment and Governance
          • 8.3.3.2. System Resilience
          • 8.3.3.3. Co-location
        • 8.3.4. Preventing Market Abuse – Article 16 of MAR
        • 8.3.5. Tick Size Regime, Article 49 of MiFID II
        • 8.3.6. Admission, Suspension, Removal, Access and Monitoring of Financial Instruments
          • 8.3.6.1. Issuers
          • 8.3.6.2. Members
      • 8.4. Concluding Remarks
  • PART III – PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
    • Chapter 9. Four Perspectives based on the TILPAG-Analysis
      • 9.1. Introduction
      • 9.2. How Should the Pie be Split?
        • 9.2.1. Liquidity and Transparency Thresholds
        • 9.2.2. Open Access to Clearing Services
        • 9.2.3. Removal of Sector Barriers Requires Balanced Responses
      • 9.3. The Modern Concentration Principle
        • 9.3.1. The Volume Cap Mechanism and the Trading Obligation
          • 9.3.1.1. The Revised SI-Regime
        • 9.3.2. New Venues, New Approaches
      • 9.4. HFT is a Legal and Valid Trading Strategy
        • 9.4.1. Positive and Negative Externalities
          • 9.4.1.1. Positive Externalities Equals Legitimate Trading Strategy
          • 9.4.1.2. Negative Externalities Equals Market Abuse
      • 9.5. Regulatory Complexity is increasing
        • 9.5.1. Searching for and Mitigating Regulatory Gaps
        • 9.5.2. Jurisdiction and Federalisation
          • 9.5.2.1. ESMA
          • 9.5.2.2. European Court of Justice
        • 9.5.3. Complexity and Trading Venues
      • 9.6. Epilogue 2015
      • 9.6. Epilogue 2015
  • References
  • Abbreviations and Definitions
  • Registre of Judgments, Rulings and Decisions
  • Appendix
    • Appendix I – Liquidity Thresholds Calculations
  • Selected Table of Legislation, Reports, Tables and Figures
    • SWEDEN:
    • GERMANY:
    • UK:
    • USA:
  • TABLES AND FIGURES
  • Index

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EU Trading Venues (1. udg.)

Af Peter Krüger Andersen

Cover til: EU Trading Venues (1. udg.)

1. udgave

1. januar 2018

  • e-ISBN: 9788771982435
  • p-ISBN: 9788757440096
  • Antal sider: 432
  • Bogtype: Afhandling

Emner

  • EU-ret

The MiFID II regime is perhaps the most comprehensive single regulatory regime concerning the financial markets to come out of EU to date. This book – which is a slightly revised version of the authors 2015 PhD thesis – provides an overview of the MiFID II regime with an analytical emphasis on the regulatory requirements placed upon trading venues and the efforts towards establishing a level playing field for order execution within the EU.

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    Cover af EU Trading Venues
    EU Trading Venues
  • / 1. udg. 2018

EU Trading Venues (1. udg.)

1. udgave - 1. januar 2018

Af Peter Krüger Andersen

Cover af EU Trading Venues (1. udg.)

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