Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstols fortolkning af konventionens artikel 6, stk. 1, fremgår af adskillige domme. Den seneste storkammer-dom er af 23. april 2015 i sag nr. 29369/10, Morice mod Frankrig. 229229. Den afgørelse bygger på og henviser til bl.a. storkammer-dom af 15. oktober 2009 i sag 17056/06, Micallef mod Malta. I dommen udtaler domstolen bl.a.:
»73. The Court reiterates that impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 must be determined according to a subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality ...
76. As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge’s conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality. This implies that, in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge or a body sitting as a bench lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the person concerned is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified ...
78. In this connection even appearances may be of a certain importance or, in other words, »justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done« ... What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public. Thus, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw ...«
Som det fremgår, er det i overensstemmelse med Menneskerettighedsdomstolens fortolkning af artikel 6, stk. 1, når Højesteret giver udtryk for, at en dommer – uden for tilfælde, som er opregnet i retsplejelovens § 60 – kun er inhabil, hvis en mistanke om manglende upartiskhed er rimeligt begrundet i objektive omstændigheder. 230230. Jf. herved Michael Ellehauge i UfR 2002B.123 ff., som konkluderer, at der er god overensstemmelse mellem Højesterets praksis og konventionspraksis, men at der er afgørelser afsagt af landsretterne og byretterne, som »må anses for at gå længere end konventionspraksis med hensyn til at statuere inhabilitet«. Som eksempel på det sidste nævner han en afgørelse fra Vestre Landsret, som erklærede alle landsrettens dommere inhabile i en sag, hvori en af landsrettens dommere var begæret afhørt som vidne.